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As for methods of infiltration, the literature suggests 
that the choice of starting a new business or infiltrating 
an existing company may depend on the crime plan 
and business sector infiltrated. Licences, permits, 
the importance of creditworthiness and an existing 
customer base are some factors that make taking 
over an existing business preferable to starting a new 
one. Quick credit or telemarketing frauds, on the other 
hand, may be more suitable for new businesses. Both 
the literature and seminars underline that starting up a 
new business in Sweden is relatively easy. Some even 
argue that constantly starting up new businesses has 
become a strategy for organised crime groups. 
Management strategies to infiltrate businesses are 
perhaps the least researched aspect of infiltration. 
This may have to do with the fact that some infiltrated 
companies are used to conduct credit fraud, and 
when this is done, they simply go bankrupt. Moreover, 
management strategies may be of limited importance 
in the legal process. Research suggests, however, that 
the longer the time frame of the criminal group, the 
more careful it is to keep the company in general, and 
the records in particular, in order (see Brå, 2011b). 
Keeping the accounting by the book is less important in 
shorter crime plans.
7. United Kingdom50
7.1 Introduction
The Home Office (2013) estimated that around 5,500 
organised crime groups are currently operating in the 
United Kingdom and involve approximately 37,000 
individuals, mostly generalist career criminals (Francis, 
Humphreys, Kirby, & Soothill, 2013). The socioeconomic 
cost of organised crime is estimated at approximately 
£24 billion every year. The groups involved in serious 
and organised crime in the UK are heterogeneous 
in terms of personal characteristics and offending 
histories and trajectories (Francis et al., 2013), and 
have different ethnic and national origins. Cross-ethnic 
partnerships have also been documented (Ruggiero 
& Khan, 2006). While more traditional, hierarchically 
structured groups do exist, research shows that 
many British criminal groups have a loose structural 
organisation, more typical of a network than a family 
(Hornsby & Hobbs, 2007; Levi & Maguire, 2004). In 
other words, they tend to be individuals who decide to 
join forces for the duration of their criminal activities 
and dissolve afterwards.
The UK is exposed to organised crime group investments 
in, and infiltration of, legal businesses, which tend to 
be used to cover, support and/or facilitate criminal 
activities. While most business sectors have been 
targeted at some point in time, the financial sector and 
cash-rich overt businesses are particularly vulnerable 
and have been exploited, typically to launder money 
and invest illicit profits (Home Office, 2013). Whilst 
most organised crime groups investing in British legal 
economies are either based or have ‘headquarters’ in 
the UK, the literature highlights a number of cases of 
investments from organised crime groups based outside 
of (or branching out to) the UK (e.g. Campana, 2011; 
Home Office, 2013; Macaulay, 2011; D. Silverstone, 
2011). Furthermore, British-based organised crime 
groups have invested abroad (e.g. in Spain and the 
Netherlands) and, in particular, have laundered illicit 
proceeds elsewhere - both in Europe and outside 
Europe (e.g. Hobbs, 1998; Siddle, 2013; Thompson, 
2002).
The general extent which organised crime poses a 
serious threat to British national security is debatable 
(Campbell, 2014). The context in which ‘the extent 
to which both the criminal actors and the impact of 
their crimes in their totality (sic) represents a threat 
to national security … remains contested […although] 
countermeasures are needed to monitor and inhibit 
their growth’ (Levi, 2014, p. 12). In this sense, the 
establishment of the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA) in 2006 and its replacement in 2013 with the 
National Crime Agency (NCA) are indicative of a strong 
institutional push towards fighting organised crime in 
all its forms. This push is supported by the introduction 
of direct and indirect legislation dealing with financial 
crimes committed by organised crime groups and 
including, for example, powers to confiscate criminal 
assets under the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002, 
the criminalisation of frauds under the Fraud Act 2006, 
and stronger anti-money laundering measures under 
both the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 and the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008.
50. With the collaboration of David Wall and Stefano Bonino (University of 
Durham, United Kingdom).
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Methodological remarks
Information on organised crime groups’ investments 
in British legal economy is limited. Although, subject 
to Home Office direction and funding, the UK Police 
forces tend to operate independently from one another 
and researchers need to access them separately. The 
British policing system therefore lacks a structured 
centralised repository of accessible data on organised 
crime. Furthermore, inter-agency and public-private 
partnerships tend to be inhibited by ‘differences in formal 
performance objectives, culture and even personalities’ 
(Levi, 2014, p. 12), which further complicates research 
on organised crime in general and on investments in 
the legitimate economy in particular.
Figure 26. Percentage of references to OCG 
infiltration in open sources by type of source
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The Database on Criminal Infiltration (DCI), compiled for 
this research, collected 257 references to OCG infiltration 
in legal businesses in the United Kingdom. Figure 26 
shows the variety of sources used to gather information 
on OCG infiltration in the UK.51 These include: academic 
literature, government strategies, policy reports, police 
investigations, judicial evidence, institutional reports 
(e.g. UK Border Agency, HMRC, Organised Crime 
Taskforce, Financial Action Taskforce), press releases 
and online newspapers. While the quality of data offered 
by online newspapers varies, and a lack of centralised 
data on organised crime groups’ investments in legal 
economies presents methodological limitations, the 
broad variety of sources has provided a useful, albeit 
preliminary, understanding of organised crime groups’ 
infiltration in British legitimate economies. The DCI is a 
starting point for assembling a nation-wide overview of 
infiltration. 
7.2 Drivers
The economic downturn and post-2008 austerity 
measures, combined with the growth of modern 
technologies provide new opportunities, incentives and 
avenues to engage in criminal activities that respond 
and adapt to the changing environment, thus making 
organised crime an evolving and dynamic threat (Home 
Office, 2009). According to the Serious Organised Crime 
Taskforce (2010), profit and power are the over-riding 
priorities of organised crime groups, whose criminal 
activities happen to be means to achieve such ends. 
The current literature on criminal infiltration in the 
UK demonstrates that profiting from illegal activities, 
laundering money (this being an indirect form of profit) 
and concealing illicit activities are the main reasons why 
organised crime groups infiltrate legitimate businesses 
in the UK. The literature also highlights that organised 
crime groups infiltrate economic sectors and businesses 
that are most conducive to supporting, facilitating and 
hiding their criminal activities of choice. While small, 
local organised crime groups tend to operate within 
their own territories, larger groups operate nationally, 
often in areas populated with business activities or 
historically linked to organised crime, and sometimes 
internationally, taking advantage of the possibility to 
connect with foreign criminals, to launder money and 
to commit crimes, such as frauds, that are difficult to 
detect.
The United Kingdom Threat Assessment (UKTA) 
identifies the main threats originating from organised 
crime groups as: ‘[1] trafficking of controlled drugs; [2] 
organised immigration crime (people smuggling and 
human trafficking); [3] financial crime (fraud); and [4] 
organised acquisitive crime (e.g. armed robbery, road 
freight crime and organised vehicle theft)’ (Home 
Office, 2011, p. 9). According to the same report, drug 
trafficking and distribution is carried out by around half 
of organised crime groups. Money laundering is also 
connected with many organised crime groups’ activities. 
The observations are in line with the information 
recorded in the Database on Criminal Infiltration and the 
references collected show a disproportionate amount of 
criminal activities clustering around money laundering, 
51. References were identified through key words such as: 1) organised 
crime OR criminal organisation OR criminal group AND infiltrat* (infiltration, 
infiltrated); 2) organised crime OR criminal organisation OR criminal group 
AND compan* (company, companies); 3) organised crime OR criminal 
organisation OR criminal group AND business; 4) organised crime OR 
criminal organisation OR criminal group AND money laundering.
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drug trafficking and fraud. Other criminal activities 
include human trafficking, arms sale, prostitution, 
counterfeiting, cigarette smuggling, handling of stolen 
goods, illegal waste disposal. 
This is not to say that a traditional goal of organised 
crime groups - control of the territory - has been 
completely abandoned. Yet, as research conducted by 
Hobbs (2001, 2013) demonstrates, the boundaries 
between the local and the global have intersected 
and blurred, and as a consequence, the activities of 
OCGs have diversified and extended beyond clearly 
demarcated territories. In fact:
[…] unlike previous eras, contemporary 
organised crime with its emphasis 
upon drugs, fraud and counterfeiting, 
simultaneously occupies both the local 
and global. Further, these criminal 
activities offer the possibility of moving 
from one sphere to another (Hobbs, 
1998, p. 419).
Certainly, British organised crime groups might seek 
to control an illicit market, for example the drug 
distribution in Liverpool and in London (Lavorgna, 
Lombardo, & Sergi, 2013), or particular communities, 
such as Chinese criminals intimidating communities of 
fellow countrymen to expand their interests in the UK 
(Adamoli, Di Nicola, Savona, & Zoffi, 1998). They may 
also seek to control a business sector, for example 
the Bikers’ partial control of the real estate sector 
(Adamoli et al., 1998). However, there is no indication 
that UK OCGs primarily intend to control a territory 
or to monopolise a business sector when infiltrating 
legitimate economies. This may well be a consequence 
of their criminal activities, which often occur without 
investments in legal businesses.
It is true that organised crime groups, such as ‘Tuckers 
Firm’, used security companies and resorted to 
violence to control the London and Essex territories 
by extorting licensed businesses and discouraging 
competitors’ encroachment (Windle, 2013). It is also 
true that criminal networks appear to have infiltrated 
the food industry (Elliott, 2013). Nevertheless, many 
organised crime groups simply trade in the market 
instead of intending to govern it. This observation 
relates to the idea of ‘functional diversification’ of mafia 
activities that Campana (2011) uses to describe the 
different purposes of the Italian La Torre Clan’s various 
activities, that is, governing territories and sectors in 
Italy while simply trading in markets in Scotland and the 
Netherlands.
Money laundering. The DCI showed a high number of 
cases in which organised crime groups have laundered 
money through a broad range of legitimate businesses. 
Whether it be a local gang, a wider national, more 
sustained criminal group or a network of criminals 
operating internationally, money laundering remains 
a prime motivation for investing in legal businesses, 
especially money service businesses and other cash-
intensive businesses (Organised Crime Task Force, 
2013), as they can be used as front companies to 
legitimise cash obtained from illegal activities. Money 
has been laundered through businesses within sectors 
such as bars and restaurants, construction, wholesale 
and retail trade, transportation and renting of motor 
vehicles, hotels and other tourist accommodation.
Profit and concealment of illicit activities. The DCI 
suggests that profit is a key reason behind the infiltration 
of legitimate businesses and is predominantly made 
through fraud, drug trafficking and a range of other 
crimes. These criminal activities often intersect with 
money laundering insofar as the former might require 
the latter to legitimise illicit profits. The literature also 
demonstrates that organised crime groups invest in 
businesses which make it easy to conduct fraudulent 
activities ranging from local, smaller frauds (e.g. 
insurance frauds) to global, multimillion frauds (e.g. VAT 
frauds). 
Box 3. A fraud conducted through a car hire company 
in the South East
Between 2008 and 2009 a small group of 
criminals with different roles (director, leaseholder 
of the office premises, and odd-man) worked in 
a legal car hire business in the South East and 
started using the company to conduct frauds. By 
exploiting the transportation and renting of motor 
vehicles sector and by using the legal ownership 
of, and involvement in the car hire company, they 
rented £500,000 worth of cars from reputable 
vehicle hire companies using false details and 
false credit cards. Then, they sold on these cars 
to other companies in the UK and abroad. All but 
two vehicles were recovered by the police. The 
four members of the group were given prison 
sentences of between 14 months and 4.5 years.
Profit can also be made through other criminal activities 
for which legitimate businesses can offer support, 
facilitation and cover. These activities include the sale of 
counterfeit tobacco in pubs (von Lampe, 2006), human 
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trafficking in the catering sector (D. Silverstone, 2011), 
the aiding and abetting of prostitution within escort 
agencies, illegal waste dumping and avoiding landfill tax 
and other costs as part of the infiltration of the waste 
industry (Mills, 2013). Furthermore, criminals have also 
used sham companies to legitimise corporations that 
are involved in arms trafficking outside the UK; they 
have counterfeited currency at printing businesses and 
vehicle garages; and they have sold both counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals online and other counterfeit products 
in retail stores.
Drug trafficking is the main source of profit of many 
organised crime groups, however, the main reason for 
infiltrating a legal business is often to conceal the illicit 
activity of drug trafficking and other crimes. Examples 
of such are the use of sham cafés, both to plan and 
deliver drugs, or as centres for illegal gambling; luxury 
goods companies to hide heroin dealing or to launder 
dirty money (or both); clothing companies to cover 
drug trading activities or to sell counterfeit goods; 
hairdressing salons to deal cocaine and grocery shops 
to import and distribute drugs (Hales & Hobbs, 2010). 
7.3 Infiltrated territories
According to the Home Office, ‘organised criminal 
activity is concentrated in London and the South East, 
the North West and the West Midlands, but all areas of 
the country suffer the effects of this criminality’ (Home 
Office, 2011, p. 9). The Home Office further observes 
that organised crime groups operate across territories 
policed by different police forces, therefore making it 
hard to identify the precise location of their activities. 
Also, far from it being only a nationally and locally 
situated phenomenon, the infiltration by organised 
groups also operates transnationally. This is the case 
when UK-based criminals infiltrate companies abroad 
to conduct illegal activities abroad and/or in the UK. It is 
also the case where foreign criminals infiltrate business 
sectors in the UK and then conduct illegal activities in 
the UK and/or abroad. 
The DCI indicates geographical differences in the 
infiltration of legitimate businesses. Although we 
must be wary of the potential bias caused by such low 
levels of data, the DCI does provide some evidence of 
a geographical distribution of OCG infiltration in legal 
businesses, with thriving business areas and territories 
historically connected with organised crime being 
particularly represented (Figure 27). Parts of Scotland, 
for example, appear prone to be targeted (though these 
findings must be treated with some caution because of 
low levels of data and possible reporting biases).
Figure 27. Number of references to OCG infiltration in 
open sources by region (NUTS 2)52
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Source: UDUR elaboration on DCI data (N.B. low levels of data)
7.4 Infiltrated business sectors
British organised crime groups infiltrate business 
sectors that are more easily exploitable in order to 
support, facilitate and hide their criminal activities of 
choice. The financial sector is especially vulnerable to 
money laundering and ‘in excess of £1 billion a year 
is laundered through money service businesses (MSBs) 
and informal value transfer systems alone’ (Home Office, 
2013, p. 19). Both aggregate level data and specific 
cases recorded in the DCI confirm that organised crime 
groups in the UK have heavily infiltrated the financial 
sector and have made use of money service businesses 
to launder money (Levi & Maguire, 2004). As 
identified in the case studies selected for the analysis, 
weaknesses include structural fragmentations, lack of 
communication between companies, the exploitability 
of regulations on intra-European transactions, and 
problems in the early detection of the criminal activities 
of small businesses. 
Furthermore, ‘illicit profits are often laundered through 
cash-rich overt businesses, which very often operate 
on the high street and typically include nail bars, food 
and licensed premises, companies offering security 
services, taxi firms and car washes’ (Home Office, 
2013, p. 19). The literature, summarised in the DCI, 
confirms the Home Office’s findings and records a 
disproportionate number of cases in which organised 
crime groups have used cash intensive businesses to 
52. Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 2) are available for 168 
references.
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launder money, conduct or conceal drug trafficking 
activities and undertake other illegal activities, such 
as prostitution, sale of counterfeit or smuggled goods, 
handling of stolen goods, human trafficking, and illegal 
waste disposal. Cash-rich overt businesses present 
opportunities for crime: they can be set up quickly and 
cheaply, with a few criteria to be satisfied by the director, 
and can help legitimise crime proceeds. 
Cases of infiltration to facilitate, support and/or hide 
drug trafficking, money laundering, fraud and other 
crimes have been recorded within various sectors, 
such as: personal service activities; hotels, bars and 
restaurants (Annison, 2013; Boff, 2013; Hales & 
Hobbs, 2010; Hobbs, 1998; D. Silverstone & Savage, 
2010; Webb & Burrows, 2009); clubs and gambling 
activities (FATF, 2009a, 2009b; Gambling Commission, 
2013); transportation (Home Office, 2013; Organised 
Crime Task Force, 2013); support service activities (e.g. 
private security) (Windle, 2013); wholesale and retail 
trade (Hales & Hobbs, 2010); construction (Campana, 
2011; L’Hoiry, 2013); financial and insurance activities 
(CIFAS, 2013); waste and scrap management (Mills, 
2013); and manufacturing (Elliott, 2013). Figure 28 
ranks business sectors according to their level of 
evidence of infiltration by organised crime groups.
Figure 28. Number of references of OCG infiltration in open sources by business sector53
Source: UDUR elaboration on DCI data
Some sectors tend to be targeted in specific locations, 
although it is hard to make a strong connection between 
sectors and territories, especially in a country where 
organised crime groups are not as deeply embedded 
in social and political structures as is the case in other 
European countries (e.g. Mafia groups in Italy). Therefore, 
the most targeted sectors have been infiltrated across 
very different locations, including thriving business 
areas, both well-off and deprived areas, and areas 
where British organised crime groups have historically 
had a foothold (e.g. Liverpool, Glasgow, London). 
Figure 29 identifies the regions with at least one 
reference of OCG infiltration in the top 3 sectors for 
number of references found in open sources: wholesale 
and retail trade; hotels, bars and restaurants; and clubs 
and gambling activities..
53. Details on the business sector of the infiltration (NACE 0-digit) are 
available for 248 references.
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Figure 29. Regions (NUTS 1) with at least one reference to OCG infiltration in open sources in the top 3 infiltrated 
sectors54
Transportation Hotels, bars and restaurants Clubs and gambling activities
Source: UDUR elaboration on DCI data (N.B. low levels  of data)
7.5. Actors and modi operandi
Using ethno-national labels to categorise organised 
crime groups is very problematic in multicultural 
countries such as the UK. Ethno-national categories 
are not homogeneous per se, and their members 
may not be nationals of the countries whose label 
is attached to them or may not affiliate with such a 
label. Privileging ethnicity, race and nationality over 
other social categories does not provide a strongly 
reliable explanation for organised crime activities in 
the UK (Murji, 2007). Despite the difficulties in inferring 
organising principles through ethno-national labels, an 
attempt is made to provide a very preliminary mapping 
of the activities of different organised crime groups 
across different sectors and different territories.
The most active group are British career criminals 
who are responsible for the infiltration of all the major 
sectors within all the major territories where references 
of criminal infiltration were found. ‘British’ may include 
a good number of people born abroad and who acquired 
British citizenship years after migrating and living in 
the UK (around 6% of the total British population in 
the Census 2011). All other groups tend to infiltrate 
London, but also Scotland (Italians), North West and the 
West Midlands (Chinese), and the South East (Turkish). 
Most of these groups infiltrate business sectors with a 
relatively high number of references of infiltration, and 
possibly those in which they would normally engage 
in legal activities. For example, the Italian La Torre 
clan infiltrated Scottish, as well as Dutch and Italian, 
territories, setting up food and alcohol import-export 
businesses, restaurants, pubs, health and fitness 
centres and construction companies in Scotland to be 
used to launder money that they had obtained from 
illegal activities in Southern Italy (Campana, 2011; 
Forgione, 2009). Similarly, the London-based Baybasin 
family invested in British cafés and seaside resorts and 
foreign exchange businesses to launder money and 
cover drug-related offences. Table 19 summarises the 
top five sectors and locations for number of references 
of criminal infiltration by different types of OCGs.
Given that investigations mostly focus on criminal 
activities, it is not always possible to ascertain the 
exact methods of infiltration, control and management 
of infiltrated companies because each stage may take 
place legally before the criminal activity begins. There 
are, however, some trends that are observable in the 
British context and regular (legitimate) acquisition 
appears to be the main method of infiltration. Criminals 
tend to purchase companies legally, or employ existing 
legitimate businesses already owned by a member of 
the group to subsequently support, facilitate and hide 
criminal activities. While it is difficult to identify at what 
exact point a business turns from legal activities to 
illegal activities and the extent to which organised crime 
groups target legitimate businesses in which they do 
not already have any existing participation, the analysis 
of the case studies has not identified cases in which 
organised crime groups placed one of their members in 
an existing legitimate businesses without some sort of 
pre-existing connection. 
54.  Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 1) for wholesale and retail 
trade, hotels, bars and restaurants, and clubs and gambling activities are 
available for 110 references.
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Table 19. Top 5 sectors and top 5 regions (NUTS 1) for number of references to OCG infiltration in open sources55
OCG Top 5 business sectors Top 5 regions (NUTS 1)
British56 Wholesale and retail trade; Transportation; Hotels, bars 
and restaurants; Financial and insurance activities; Clubs 
and gambling activities
Scotland; North East; London; North 
West; East Midlands
Italian Hotels, bars and restaurants; Wholesale and retail trade; 
Clubs and gambling activities; Construction; Real estate 
activities
Scotland; London
Chinese Hotels, bars and restaurants; Wholesale and retail trade; 
Clubs and gambling activities; Personal service activities
London; North West; West Midlands
Russian/
Georgian
Wholesale and retail trade; Clubs and gambling activities; 
Financial and insurance activities
London
Other OCGs Wholesale and retail trade;  Hotels, bars and restaurants; 
Financial and insurance activities; Transportation; Con-
struction
London; Scotland; South East; North 
East; North West; East Midlands
Source: UDUR elaboration on DCI
As far as infiltration at management level is concerned, 
the number of case studies that offer such a level of 
detail are extremely small in number. Therefore the 
findings need to be treated with great caution. There 
seems to be a mix of profitable and non-profitable 
companies: that is, some companies would survive 
even without the criminal activities - which may just 
be a way to increase profit. Other companies, however, 
would collapse if profits from criminal activities were to 
be removed, whereas other companies are set up and 
run illegally from the outset.
Box 4. An unprofitable car hire company partners 
with a profitable claims management company to 
conduct insurance frauds in the North East
In what is believed to be the largest ‘crash for 
cash’ fraud (court case still ongoing) in the 
UK, a group of criminals scammed insurance 
companies for hundreds of thousands of British 
pounds sterling between 2008 and 2010. 
The owner of a car recovery, storage and hire 
company formed a partnership with the owner of 
a claims management and taxi hire/replacement 
company. Together with the two businesses’ 
employees, family members and friends, the 
group defrauded insurance companies as part 
of a scam that involved staging and voluntarily 
causing car accidents and fabricating and/
or manipulating circumstances. The claims 
management company could operate legally 
without criminal activities, and frauds were simply 
a way to accelerate business and increase profit 
levels. However, the car recovery, storage and 
hire company would collapse once the criminal 
activities were eliminated. The two companies 
merged their activities in order to place, layer and 
integrate cash through personal and business 
bank accounts and they obtained assets with the 
aim of legitimising cash gained from fraudulent 
insurance claims. Economic profit was the main 
reason for infiltration. The targeted sector was 
the insurance one, which appears to suffer from 
structural fragmentation and to be exploitable 
by criminals. Some members of the group had 
been active as local criminals in the area for years 
before this case.
55.  Details on the region of the infiltration (NUTS 1) and OCG are available 
for 166 references. Details on the business sector of the infiltration (NACE 
1-digit) are available for 206 references.
56. This includes English, Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish organised 
crime groups.
Further and more systematic research is needed in this 
area, but the DCI as a whole suggests that business 
sectors are chosen for their capacity to support, 
facilitate and hide criminal activities. Hence, cash-rich 
intensive businesses and the financial sector are the 
main targets of infiltration. Equally, small businesses 
with low margins of profit and competition from bigger 
businesses could drive owners to look for illegal ways to 
increase their revenues. The preference for small sized 
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companies by many organised crime groups may also 
be a ploy to avoid early detection. Similarly, the growing 
number of missing trader intra-community frauds, the 
vulnerable nature of VAT-free import/export trades to/
from Europe may actively encourage infiltration. The 
use of off-shore bank accounts also helps hide money 
and assets outside the UK, ensuring that criminals 
have financial supply to continue their activities and 
making it hard for law enforcement agencies to follow 
the money. Finally, criminals often use interconnected 
companies under the ownership of different members 
of the criminal groups both to increase the effectiveness 
of their business and criminal activities and to avoid 
raising suspicions whilst giving the impression of 
legitimacy about their activities.
7.6 Conclusions
British organised crime groups operate at various 
intersecting levels which include local, national, 
transnational and global territories. These groups 
are diverse and their members can be, for example, 
English, Welsh, Scottish, Turkish, Chinese, Vietnamese, 
Colombian, Russian, or Italian in origin, although these 
characteristics may not necessarily be relevant to the 
formation or structure of organised crime groups in a 
strongly multicultural country. Within the UK, organised 
crime groups appear to operate predominantly in the 
London area, the North West and in parts of Scotland. 
Here, it should be noted that the use of aggregate data 
and a potential bias in the sources (including news 
reporting biases) may have coloured these findings. 
The criminal activities of choice mostly involve money 
laundering, drug trafficking and fraud. Some organised 
crime groups also engage in crimes, such as human 
trafficking, illegal immigration, arms sale, prostitution, 
corruption, counterfeiting, cigarette smuggling, and 
handling stolen goods. They infiltrate business sectors 
that can be more easily used to support, facilitate and 
cover such activities. The main reason behind the 
infiltration of legitimate businesses is profit and/or to 
conceal illegal activities and to launder money. There 
is little evidence to suggest that the infiltration is to 
achieve the higher and longer term goal of controlling 
territories or core business sectors.
Organised crime in the UK has had a greater impact 
on the financial sector, private security, transportation 
and renting motor vehicles, bars and restaurants and 
the wholesale and retail trade sector. As highlighted 
by Home Office reports, cash-intensive businesses 
are extremely vulnerable to infiltration, especially 
money laundering, while money service businesses are 
allegedly contributing to the laundering of £1 billion 
every year. The Money Laundering Regulations 2007 
have introduced stricter regulations and responsibilities 
for MSBs and banking companies, although its success 
in deterring organised crime groups is to be seen.
Organised crime groups participate in businesses 
through ownership and management: for example, 
setting up a business using dirty money or to launder 
money, or by using an existing business where one or 
more OCG members is already in place to conduct and 
cover criminal activities. The drivers for infiltration are 
many and opportunity plays a major role, especially 
during a bleak economic climate in which some sectors, 
for example, cash-intensive businesses such as bars 
and restaurants experienced a reduction in profits and 
margins. A number of organised crime groups turn 
their legal activities into illegal businesses in order to 
boost their profits. The use of small companies, the 
exploitable intra-European trade regulations, off-shore 
bank accounts, etc., all drive and sustain infiltration.
